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THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 




According to the 20th Act of 1931, any legal action that the Cartel Court oversees, the 
principles of Code of Civil Procedure (Act I of 1911) had to be applied, for it was the 
first one that regulated the legal situation of cartels in Hungary.1 These basic principles in 
procedural law were as follows: the principal of disposition of the participants, the principle 
of discussion, the principle of verbalism, the principle of publicity and the principle of free 
verification. In this study, I intend to describe the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
which, of course, were relevant during the legal actions of the Cartel Court, as well.
There was no general part in Act I of 1911 (Pp.), which contained the basic principles in 
a unified manner, but they were enclosed in separate chapters in connection to legal actions. 
In my study I would like to describe the main characteristics of the contemporary basic 
principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, which determine the Code of Civil Procedures 
to this day.2
Principle of Disposition:
In connection to verification, during any legal action of the Cartel Court, the principle of 
free verification was limited and the principle of officiality predominated that in order to 
provide an opinion or an expert’s report, they could turn to the Cartel Board ex officio. In 
any other case, the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure were in effect during the process 
of verification.3
In civil lawsuits, the participants could vindicate their needs in the field of private law. 
This referred to as their administrative rights in civil lawsuits.4 The participants could 
decide on the legal relationship between them freely during the lawsuit, but outside of the 
legal action, they remained “masters of the object of the lawsuit”.5 In connection to this 
1 This research was supported by the project nr. EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00007, titled Aspects on the development 
of intelligent, sustainable and inclusive society: social, technological, innovation networks in employment 
and digital economy. The project has been supported by the European Union, co-financed by the European 
Social Fund and the budget of Hungary. Ranschburg Nándor: Karteljog, kartelszervezet. Iparjogvédelmi 
Egyesület, Budapest, 1931. 107., Harasztosi Király Ferenc: A kartel. Grill Károly Könyvkiadóvállalata, 
Budapest, 1936. 534., Jancsó György: A magyar Polgári perrendtartás rendszeres kézikönyve. Athenaeum 
Irodalmi és nyomdai Részvénytársaság, Budapest, 1912. 349-368., Falcsik Dezső: A polgári perjog tankönyve. 
Politzer-féle Könyvkiadó-vallalat, Budapest, 1908. 14-30.
2 Szlezák Lajos: A perrendi reform és a tárgyalási alapelvek. Grill Károly Könyvkiadóvállalata, Budapest, 
1937. 2.
3 Harasztosi, 1936. 536.
4 Jancsó, 1912. 350. See: Pp. articles 394., 186-187., 423., 475.; 312., 512.
5 Falcsik, 1908. 16.
506
principle, one of the most significant disposition of the code of Civil Procedures is that in 
its verdict, the court cannot decide outside of their action complaint, the damning cannot 
cross over the complaint (ne eat judex ultra petita partium).6 This principle also meant 
that the judge could not proceed ex officio (ne procedat judex ex officio).7 This was the 
embodiment of the essence of the so-called principle of disposition, which meant that the 
participants could dispose freely on their private rights relations. This ruled out an ex officio 
lawsuit, which referred to initiating a lawsuit ex officio. In order to initiate a legal action, 
an application by the plaintiff was necessary, but in order for it to have a foundation and 
start a legal action, it needed the cooperation of the respondent, the so-called appearance. 
The will of the participants determined the continuation of the legal action, as well. The 
contents of the lawsuit were defined by the applications introduced by the complainants, 
and their announcements on each other’s applications. The judge could only act according 
to the applications of the participants, and could not provide a verdict in any other case 
but what the complainants introduced to him. Dezső Falcsik determined that “without 
the will and application of the participants, there is no need to force legal benefits or no 
judicial patronization”.8
This meant that during the legal action, the participants could reach an agreement, 
thereby ending the lawsuit. The participants determined the conditions of the agreement. 
They referred to this as the court settlement, which enabled them to settle the debated 
topic. In these cases, the court only acted as a legally verification organisation.9 During 
cases where matters of civil law had to be settled, the participants had to have a guarantee 
that they can have a say in their own civil rights.10
An agreement could have been reached by the participants if they submitted the task 
of determining their legal relationship to one or more delegates, which also acted as a 
replacement for judicial decisions. In these cases, even the judge could start the formation 
of an agreement between the parties.
The limitation of the principle of disposition is that the participants’ freedom to act 
could have been limited in matters of public or state interests (i. e.: in custody cases).11
Principle of Discussion:
The principle of discussion was closely related to the principle of disposition, for a 
judge could only reach a verdict in civil rights’ cases where the participant actually asked 
for a stipulation. This bore a strong connection to the fact that the participants had to 
introduce the facts that support their assertions and demands. This means that the principle 
of discussion means, more or less, that “the participants determine which facts should be 
taken into account by the judge during a lawsuit. The participants provide factual evidence, 
and the judge cannot expand the value of legal materials, he can only judge it”.12 The judge 
did not have an option to take anything into account apart from what was presented to him 
by the participants. The judge could not question the authenticity of the facts mutually 
6 Magyary Géza: Magyar Polgári Perjog. Franklin-társulat, Budapest, s.d. 218., Falcsik, 1912. 351.
7 Falcsik, 1912. 351. See Pp. articles 5., 10., 75., 110., 267., 271., 288., 326., 340., 368., 225-226., 268.
8 Falcsik, 1908. 17.
9 Ibid. 17., Magyary Géza: A perbeli egyezségek. In: Magyary Géza r. tag összegyűjtött dolgozatai. A Magyar 
Tudományos Akadémia Kiadása, Budapest, 1942. 145-159.
10 Bacsó Jenő: Tudományos perjog. Stúdium Könyvkiadó r.-T., Budapest, 1937. 5.
11 Falcsik, 1908. 17.
12 Ibid. 18. Jancsó, 1912. 351.
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acknowledged by the participants. If one of the complainants did not acknowledge it, then 
that participant had to validate his claim.
The judge could only take those pieces of evidence into consideration which were 
subjected by the participants, which meant that the judge could not provide evidence ex 
officio. In this sense, the principle of discussion meant that the participants ruled over their 
legal claims and evidences.
In this sense, the principle of discussion referred to the question of material truths, which 
depended on the will of the participants. The judge’s verdict had to be based on the facts 
that the participants introduced. Naturally, the participants are invested in finding out the 
actual truth, and because of this, formal and material truths could both be verified during 
a lawsuit. In legal actions where public interests were in the focus and in this sense, the 
principle of discussion had to be limited, then, in order to determine the truth, the judge 
could take certain facts and evidences into account ex officio, i. e.: marriage lawsuits.13
The opposite of the principle of discussion is the principle of investigation, which could 
only be used in a civil lawsuit in extremely specific cases. This principle meant that the 
judge did not only reach his verdict based on the evidence provided by the participants, but 
could also examine facts and collect evidences ex officio. The principle of investigation 
meant that the rigid structure of the principle of discussion had to be broken in order to 
determine the material truth. During a civil lawsuit, in contrast with a criminal lawsuit, 
the principle of discussion had to prevail, according to the main rules.14 “The principle 
of discussion […] does not express the wilful rule of one participant in a lawsuit, but the 
act that one must select the necessary facts and pieces of evidence according to one’s best 
knowledge in order to reach a fair verdict.”15
Principle of Verbalism:
The principle of verbalism meant that the judicial verdict had to be based on verbally 
introduced facts. The documents of litigation, the applications and evidences had to be 
announced verbally. Certain legal actions were called oral lawsuits, and in these cases, 
the contentious actions of the participants had to be verbally realised in front of a court.16 
Basically, this was taken into effect by the Code of Civil Procedures if 1911.
A physical copy of the documents of litigation had to be turned in. That meant that 
the judge based his verdict on the applications and evidences introduced in written form. 
While the judge reached a verdict, he could only take those into account which were listed 
on the memorial. In written lawsuits, the judge did not listen to verbal statements from 
neither the participants nor any witnesses, only documents containing these statements 
were examined in order to determine the bearings of the case.17
13 Falcsik, 1908. 18., Markos Olivér – Vincenti Gusztáv: A Jogi Hírlap döntvénytára. Polgári eljárási jog II. 
Jogi Hírlap, Budapest, 1934. 157.
14 Falcsik, 1908.19., Magyary, s.d. 222-224., Jancsó, 1912. 351.
15 Magyary, s.d. 221. Jancsó, 1912. 351-355.
16 Kovács Marcel: A polgári perrendtartás magyarázata. Pesti Könyvnyomda Részvénytársaság, Budapest, 
1927. 587., Jancsó, 1912. 358., See Pp. articles 206-254., 203., 512-514., 545., 495., 533.
17 Falcsik, 1908. 20-21., Kovács, 1927. 587.
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In contrast with this, the participants are actually present during an oral lawsuit, and the 
judge actually listens to them, and has a direct connection to the participants, the witnesses 
and the experts. This also meant that the principle of verbalism worked in close connection 
to the principle of directness. The contentious actions took place while the judge was 
actually present. A very important factor in directness is that the contentious actions and 
reaching a verdict had to be done in front of the same judge. Opposite to this, if a judge 
did not hear the participants’ presentations, but the decision was based on nothing more 
that the records of these statements, than this fell under the definition of written lawsuits.
However, it can be stated that verbalism did not exclude the predominance of literacy. 
During oral lawsuits, literacy only referred to recording the legal action that took place 
in front of a court, and the contentious actions. But in written cases, the judge based his 
verdict on facts which were recorded in written forms. It is also possible to validate both 
verbalism and literacy. But it can also happen that both principles are adopted at the same 
time, and this is referred to as mixed system. In the mixed system, the two principles are 
employed together and beneficially. In the Hungarian history of procedural law, up to the 
point when Act No. 1 of 1911 came into effect, written lawsuits were predominant. Some 
exceptions were the summary procedures of the courts of appeal, which were Act No. 18, 
1893.18 The Code of Civil Procedures of 1911 modified this by making the principle of 
verbalism universal in civil lawsuits. The 1911 Code of Civil Procedure gives a bigger 
role to memorials in the task of arranging an oral lawsuit. The statements during the legal 
action had to be included in the records, so this sort of procedure could not be wholly 
considered as oral, for its most important aspect was that the principle of verbalism and 
literacy were both significantly present, but verbalism predominated. Literacy aided in 
holding and continuing an oral lawsuit, especially during more complicated legal actions.19
During the unified usage of the two principles, literacy makes it possible for the 
applications and the evidences to be literally repeated. The principle of verbalism could 
become problematic in reviewing a more substantial amount of documents of litigation. 
This is why before the 1911 Code of Civil Procedures came into effect, “the more complex 
legal actions concerning bigger values were deemed to be written lawsuits, and those legal 
actions where the object of the lawsuit was smaller and the bearings of the case were easier 
to review were deemed to be verbal”.20 However, this changed after the Act of 1911 came 
into effect. Literacy was no longer considered to be the most important assurance in such 
cases. It became the predominating opinion that the best way for the judge to take the facts 
that affect the verdict into account if the whole lawsuit takes place in front of him, the 
participants described their statements in spoken word and presented their evidences directly 
to him. The most important principles that helped finding out the material truth were the 
ones of verbalism and directness. So, in general, the principle of verbalism predominated 
in lawsuits, but in certain periods of jurisdiction, the principle of literacy was applied.
The judge accepts the documents from the participants, however, this action was not 
performed by the judge, per se, but rather a specific individual who was selected for this 
task and gave the collected documents to the judge as a collection (legal bundle). If the 
court had a question for any participants, that the procedures during a written and an oral 
18 Meszlény Arthur: Bevezető a polgári perrendtartáshoz. Athenaeum Irodalmi és Nyomdai Részvénytársulat, 
Budapest, 1911. 4.
19 Falcsik, 1908. 21-22., Jancsó, 1912. 355-357.
20 Falcsik, 1908. 23.
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lawsuit were significantly different, for these only could have been asked in written form 
,after an exchange of documents. And the complainants would also have replied in writing. 
During a specific period of oral lawsuits, the judge could ask the complainants questions, 
which could aid the legal action to be more efficient and the bearings of the case could be 
clarified even further.21
Literacy could provide ample opportunities for a lawsuit to be stretched, and this could 
have been averted by limiting the number of memorials, but this brought the limitation of 
memorials based on their contents into the picture. This is why it is said that the principle of 
literacy inevitably brought forward the principle of eventuality. This referred to the process 
that in order to avoid stretching the lawsuit for extremely long by a limitless exchange of 
documents, the number of memorials had to be limited. This also meant that the contents 
of each memorial had to be determined, and, as a rule, stress that the participants must state 
their claim, describe the bearings of the case, list all the evidence and submit a counter-
proposal. “According to this rule, the participant must provide all facts and evidences in 
advance (submitting), all of them at the same time (stacking), if any of these will possibly 
be needed (in eventum)”.22
In oral lawsuits, there is no need for the principle of possibilities, for the judge, by 
using his rights to organize the legal action, could thwart the elongation of the lawsuit. 
This is why there was no strict rule to determine the order of actions within the lawsuits, 
until the legal action was adjourned, any facts, statements and evidences could be brought 
up during an oral lawsuit. The course of the legal action was not bound, which meant that 
it was free and could be shaped in order to be quick and be beneficial in order to find out 
the material truth. Opposite to this, the written lawsuits were strict and shapeless, long, 
and put formal truth forward.23
The principle of verbalism is basically valid in both courts of the first and second degree, 
but the situation differs in re-examined cases, where it was almost minimal.24
Principle of Directness:
The principle of directness bears a close connection to the principle of verbalism, which 
means that any actions of the participants during the lawsuit could only be performed in 
front of a tribunal court. The court could only base its verdict on facts presented by the 
participants, directly to them.25 This bears a close relation to the principle of free assessment.
Principle of Publicity:
One of the most important fundamental principles of the Code of Civil Procedures is 
publicity, and in connection to this, Paragraph No. 207 stated that any participant could 
21 Falcsik, 1908. 24-25.
22 Ibid. 24-25., Kovács, 1927. 589., Jancsó, 1912. 362-364. See Pp. articles 221-222.
23 Falcsik, 1908. 26.
24 Meszlény, 1911. 5., Markos Olivér – Vincenti Gusztáv: A Jogi Hírlap döntvénytára. Polgári eljárási jog 
II. Jogi Hírlap, Budapest, 1934. 117-118
25 Falcsik, 1912. 360. See Pp. Sections: 274., 484., 501., 289., 290., 341., 351., 537.
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appeal to the court in order to exclude the general public, if doing so resulted in harming 
any equitable interest of said party.26 The exclusion of the general public could be applied 
either to the whole legal action, or only to a specific part of it. If a legal action would 
result in the publication of information that would harm the business secrets or any other 
equitable interests of the members of the cartel, the court could order the exclusion of the 
general public even in the middle of the trial.27
The only reason when the basic principles of the Code of Civil Procedures had to be 
put to effect if the Cartel Law did not contain any declinatory mandates. The court was 
obliged to do anything in its power to keep the competitors of the cartel from acquiring 
any data announced during the legal action that fell into the definition of business secret. 28
The principle of publicity meant social verification and control over the judicial system. 
Publicity meant that everyone had the fundamental right to be present at the action of the 
participants and the courthouse. “Publicity can be considered as one of the basic foundations 
of contemporary legislation and orderly reforms of procedural, next to verbalism and 
directness”.29 The practice of public functions had to be performed with the verification 
of the principle of publicity. Since it was realised in both in administration and legislation, 
its predominance had to be ensured in the judiciary system, as well, for it advances the 
thoroughness and reliability of arbitration. This does not only have an effect on the actions 
of judges, but can also enforce the honesty of the participants and the witnesses, for they 
are less likely to provide dishonest statements or commit perjury when faced with publicity.
The principle of publicity can be limited in certain cases and circumstances. The size of 
the courtroom basically determines the extent of publicity. The judicial body could exclude 
the misbehaving individuals from the courtroom. The court could limit or completely 
exclude the public in public matters or equitable private matters. Not all aspects of the 
lawsuit were made public.30
The principle of publicity is a very important guarantee of civil lawsuits, the constitutional 
proof of the individual and public freedom.31
Principle of Free Assessment of Evidence:
The Code of Civil Procedures only allowed the predominance of the principle of investigation 
in a limited manner, and that was valid for the cases of the Cartel Court. According to these 
rules (CCP, Paragraphs 323 to 326), the Cartel Court had the authority to ask a concerned 
participant to exhibit any documents in proof that were connected to the legal action. Apart 
from these, it could not ask for any other data or consult.32
26 Jancsó, 1912. 366., Kovács, 1927. 579-581.
27 Ranschburg, 1931. 107., Harasztosi Király, 1936. 535.
28 Ranschburg, 1931. 107.
29 Magyary Géza: A magyar polgári peres eljárás alaptanai. (A perbeli cselekmények tana). Franklin-Társulat, 
Budapest, 1898. 123. See Pp. Sections: 206., 393., 218., 514., 545., 206., 207., 646., 710., 723., 729., 731.
30 Falcsik, 1908. 26., Markos Olivér – Vincenti Gusztáv: A Jogi Hírlap döntvénytára. Polgári eljárási jog. I. 
A Jogi Hírlap kiadása, Budapest, 1931. 65.
31 Jancsó, 1912. 364-365.
32 Harasztosi Király, 1936. 536.
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Based on the principle of discussion, the participants had to provide evidence. The point 
of verification was that the evidence was submitted to the judge, and based on these, the 
judge could ascertain the authenticity of the debated fact. The judge examined and assessed 
the proof, and drew a conclusion. “Due to their occupation, judges have a fundamental right 
to assess the evidence freely; for they are the only ones who can determine how convincing 
the reality behind the facts and the submitted evidence was”.33 Assessment was charged 
to the participant who had interest in the court to consider the introduced fact to be true.34
The free assessment of evidence was an extremely big power for the judge, but he could 
not practice it without supervision, for he had to provide reasoning for each of his decisions. 
The “good judge will not misuse this responsibility, the ignorant and unconscientious 
judge will not reach a right verdict even with free assessment, in contrast to the judge 
who cannot reach a just verdict without free assessment, in contrast to the fact if judicial 
convictions should bind a judge, even the most educated and determined judge becomes 
inhibited in his duties.”35
If we expect that a judge should reach a verdict according to reality, then he must be 
provided with the freedom to find out the truth. This system was called the one based on free 
assessment of evidence, or the system of material verification. The judge shall determine 
the significance of each piece of evidence, after the process of assessment.
The opposite of free assessment was bound assessment, or the formal verification 
system. This system legally predetermined the value of each piece of evidence. This meant 
that in the presence of legal conditions, the judge had to take the verification of evidences 
as facts into account. In this system a judge considered whether or not the legally bound 
evidences are present, and based on this, the fact that was under assessment was judged 
to be true or false. This was inherent in the so-called accusatory lawsuits.
The restriction of free assessment can only be necessary if the safety of the legal system 
demands it, for the verification of certain documents must be compulsory. Especially those 
which were created by law in order for them to serve as evidence (i. e.: authentication 
documents). In itself, free assessment is not enough to provide material truths, but can 
provide freedom for judicial conviction, it does not exclude the possibility of mistakes 
or misuse.36
The basic principles of the Code of Civil Procedures affect the whole legal procedure of 
the Cartel Court too. They are common themes that fundamentally determine the structure 
of the procedures, the separate legal institutions and the purpose and methodology of the 
procedure, even if their contents changed in the meantime. The basic principles determine the 
course of the procedure as a whole. A part of the basic principles, since they are principles 
valid in the whole administration of justice, are regulated on a constitutional level, and 
thereby expressing their significance in Procedural Law.
33 Falcsik, 1908. 28., Falcsik, 1912. 361-362. See Pp. articles 270., 315., 317., 272., 377., Ruhmann Emil: A 
Jogi Hírlap döntvénytára. Polgári eljárási jog V. Jogi Hírlap, Budapest, 1943. 135-140, Markos Olivér – 
Vincenti Gusztáv: A Jogi Hírlap döntvénytára. Polgári eljárási jog II. Jogi Hírlap, Budapest, 1934. 72-73., 
Markos Olivér – Vincenti Gusztáv: A Jogi Hírlap döntvénytára. Polgári eljárási jog. I. Jogi Hírlap, Budapest, 
1931. 70-71.
34 Magyary, s.d,. 398.
35 Falcsik, 1908. 28.
36 Falcsik, 1908. 28-29., Meszlény, 1911. 8.
